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The European debt crisis has again demonstrated the importance of bank risk for the understanding of sovereign risk. But to
what extent is the effect of the risk of the local banking system measurable in the dynamics of sovereign CDS spreads? In this
paper, we use BIS consolidated banking statistics to construct a simple risk-weighted measure of foreign exposures of a banking
system and apply it to data from 17 countries. Our measure shows how the size and riskiness of foreign asset holdings of the
largest banks are an important determinant, not only of their own CDS premiums but also of the CDS premiums of the sovereign
in which the banks reside. Extensive robustness checks conﬁrm that the signiﬁcance of our measure cannot be attributed to
common variation in CDS spreads. We ﬁnd that our exposure measure is signiﬁcant in explaining sovereign CDS premiums
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375R. Kallestrup et al. / Journal of Empirical Finance 38 (2016) 374–393Our measure is useful not only because it is simple to compute, but also in that it provides an exogenous source of variation of
bank credit risk, which is not affected by the risk of the sovereign in which the bank resides. In other words, while our measure is
clearly capturing an important source of credit risk of the bank, it has the advantage that the resulting effect on the sovereign
does not give rise to a direct feedback loop from the sovereign back to the bank. This is because we focus on the foreign
exposures. The effect of foreign exposures of domestic banks is economically signiﬁcant in that a one standard deviation change
in our risk exposure measure changes sovereign CDS spreads on average by 24 bp, which amounts to a quarter of the average
standard deviation for sovereign CDS in our sample. Longstaff et al. (2011) argue that the inﬂuence of the US equity and high
yield markets on sovereign CDS premiums dominates that of the local stock market. Our results suggest that the risk from the
local banking system should be included as a signiﬁcant local factor. This local risk factor remains signiﬁcant when we include
a global sovereign CDS index, whereas the effect from the US market then disappears.
The risk of the banks as measured by our exposure measure is likely to affect sovereign CDS spreads through implicit or
explicit guarantees of the banking system. To explore this, we combine information on the size of the banking system
relative to GDP with the riskiness measured both through CDS premiums and bank EDFs. These measures of the size and
risk of the guarantees greatly inﬂuence sovereign CDS premia, even after controlling for traditional local ﬁscal measures
and global factors.
While our measure is shown to be important for sovereign CDS spreads, we focus also more directly on its impact on bank CDS
spreads because of the clear policy implications. In its 2011/2012 so-called capital exercises, the European Banking Authority put a
heavy emphasis on bank holdings of sovereign debt with a particular focus on exposures to the so-called GIIPS countries. These
exercises were conducted in order to assess the need for additional bank capital buffers. It is worth noting, however, that foreign
private exposures are actually a much larger source of foreign exposures of banks. For a large sample of European countries, the
private exposures to GIIPS countries in late 2010 were between 4 and 10 times higher than the exposures to GIIPS sovereign
debt.1 Hence, an increased focus on the foreign private exposures in stress tests is clearly warranted.
2. Related literature
There is an extensive literature on the determinants of sovereign CDS spreads and we refer to Augustin (forthcoming) for
a review of the rapidly growing literature. Our empirical speciﬁcation includes local and global factors found in Longstaff
et al. (2011). There, the authors show large commonality with the ﬁrst principal component explaining 75% of variations
in sovereign CDS spreads in the period 2007–2010. Most of the commonality in their study is driven by global factors,
risk premiums and investment ﬂows rather than local factors. In our sample, the assets of the banking system are on average
three times the size of the country's GDP. It is therefore not surprising that in spite of solid macroeconomic fundamentals,
the risk of the banking system signiﬁcantly impacts sovereign CDS premia. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) provide a thorough
account of the role of bank risk in explaining sovereign crises in their comprehensive treatment of ﬁnancial crises through
eight centuries. Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) document the link between the banking crisis and sovereign default in different
countries in a historical perspective.
There is also an extensive literature on how sovereign risk may affect the risk of banks. Gennaioli et al. (2014) provide
theoretical underpinnings and evidence for the transmission of a sovereign debt crisis to the banking system and the real
economy, through the banks' holdings of sovereign debt.
The fact that risk may ﬂow in both directions between sovereigns and domestic banks gives rise to possible feedback loops and
this issue is treated thoroughly in Acharya et al. (2015) and in Bolton and Jeanne (2011). Acharya et al. (2015) also carry out an
empirical study and our study supplements this in several important aspects. We show that the private exposures of banks – both
foreign and domestic – are fundamental to understanding sovereign risk, and not just the bank holdings of foreign and domestic
sovereign bonds.2 The bulk of banks' foreign exposures is to the private sector and not to sovereigns. This is important, in light of
the fact alluded to above that for European countries in our sample, the private exposures to GIIPS countries are much higher in
late 2010 than their exposures to sovereign debt. Our focus on the total exposure is also in contrast with Acharya and Steffen
(2015), whose main focus is on holdings of sovereign debt. We also supplement the empirical evidence by measuring the
riskiness of the exposure both through CDS premiums and EDFs. The large total foreign exposures of banks provide a part of
the explanation for the ﬁnding of Ang and Longstaff (2013) that sovereign risk seems to ﬂow through the ﬁnancial markets rather
than being directly rooted in macroeconomic fundamentals.
There are other studies focusing on how foreign bank exposures may cause risk to spread across banking systems. Tressel
(2010) models the deleveraging of banks in countries whose banks have been exposed to losses in another country. In his
calibration, Tressel (2010) also uses the consolidated banking statistics from BIS but he does not focus on the detailed time series
of these statistics. Degryse et al. (2010) also use BIS consolidated banking statistics as a basis for simulating how shocks to one
country's banking system may propagate through the international linkages and cause contagious defaults. Their focus is not
on CDS spreads and their data end in 2006, whereas we cover the current ﬁnancial crisis all through the end of 2010.
Whether contagion through networks of exposures survives as explanatory variables, once global common factors have
been accounted for, is not widely agreed upon. For example, Eichengreen et al. (2012) use dynamic principal component analysis
to identify common latent factors underlying the dynamics of CDS premiums for 45 banks in the USA and 8 European countries. In1 The underlying data are available by request.
2 A recent version of Acharya et al. (2015) has included a measure similar to our BIS measure.
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weighted aggregate measure of foreign bank exposure survives even after correcting for observable common factors, but it is
not a contagion measure in that the measured exposures are not primarily to other banks. Rose and Spiegel (2010) ﬁnd “remark-
ably little evidence that the intensity of the crisis across countries can be easily modeled using quantitative techniques and stan-
dard data that is either country speciﬁc or links countries to the source of the crisis.” We argue that BIS statistics and CDS spreads
do indeed contribute to our understanding of cross-border risks. A spillover mechanism is described in Kaminsky et al. (2003)
who argue that a crisis of one country may spill into other countries in the presence of a “large common creditor” who in the
face of losses in one country has to delever positions in other countries. This common creditor might be collections of other
banks, ﬁnancial institutions, or hedge funds.
Our empirical analysis supports the idea that the contingent liability (or implicit guarantee) that the sovereign may be assumed to
give for the domestic banking system is a likely transmission mechanism — an issue discussed, for example, in Gray et al. (2007) and
analyzed empirically in Ejsing and Lemke (2011). They ﬁnd an increased sensitivity of sovereign debt to a global credit risk factor
(proxied by an iTraxx index of non-ﬁnancials) after the extension of bank guarantees in several European countries in the fall of
2008. Similarﬁndings are presented in Alter and Schüler (2012). Dieckmann and Plank (2012) also demonstrate the effect on sovereign
credit risk of the state of the domestic ﬁnancial sector at the time of the onset of the crisis.
3. The data
The paper explains how sovereign default risk changes when the risk of the assets of the biggest banks in the country changes.
We measure the default risk of the sovereign and of the banks through the CDS premia. Besides data on CDS premia, we need
data on the riskiness of bank investments in the domestic and foreign markets, as well as controls regarding the local and global
macroeconomic environment. Table A.3 contains an overview of the deﬁnition and data source behind all variables used in our
regressions.
Our panel consists of 17 developed economies: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France,
United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the United States.3 We have obtained
data for the period Q1:2004–Q4:2010 covering the most signiﬁcant period of banking stress and ending before the onset of the
ECB long-term reﬁnancing operations in 2011 at which point collateralized borrowing in the central bank (see below) no longer
can be used as an instrument for bank credit risk.
3.1. CDS data
We use 5-year sovereign CDS spreads, where the contracts are denominated in US dollar or Euro. Since not all the banks have
traded CDS, we focus on explaining movements of CDS spreads of the largest banks. Table A.1 lists the largest banks. The bank
CDS data are 5-year contracts, with senior unsecured debt as a reference obligation and denominated in the local currency.
We are also using bank and sovereign CDS data to construct a measure for the riskiness of exposures. The construction of the
measure is explained in detail in Section 4. We obtain the CDS data from CMA which sources their information on executable and
indicative prices directly from the largest and most active credit investors in the OTC market. We use end-of-quarter observations.
Holes in the data, most notably in the early period, are ﬁlled using the Fitch CDS pricing source.
3.2. Local bank variables
When we explain the riskiness of bank investments, we need a proxy for domestic default risk. The proxy is the median of the
expected default frequencies (EDF) from the local stock market data. The EDF provides an estimate of the default probability of a
borrower. The estimate is obtained by using a structural model to back out ﬁrm asset value and asset volatility from observed
equity prices and accounting information on leverage. From the estimated asset value and asset volatility, ‘distance-to-default’
(DD) is computed, and ﬁnally a non-parametric regression on historical data is used to ﬁnd the empirical connection between
DD and EDF, as explained in Crosbie and Bohn (2003).
Our extensive data set of EDFs covers all countries used in our exposure matrix calculations. For each country, we consider the
median of the EDFs as the relevant risk measure. For our robustness checks, we have sorted the EDFs into the following
categories: banks, other ﬁnancials, real estate, and corporate, according to their SIC codes.
3.3. Local government variables
We have collected quarterly balance sheet data for the individual countries from IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS),
OECD and Eurostat. The macro variables related to the sovereign risk we use are general government gross debt, long term exter-
nal debt, the current account, net interest payments relative to revenue and changes in the estimated budget deﬁcit. The latter
variable is calculated as the sum of the most recent year-end and year-ahead budget projection by the OECD or the IMF minus3 We exclude Canada because we have no CDS data on Canadian sovereign debt, and we exclude BIS bank statistics reporting emergingmarkets because we have no
CDS data for their banks.
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new budget projection, we interpolate a forecast.
We also take into account that the risk of a bank may be affected by the risk of the domestic sovereign through bank holdings
of domestic sovereign debt. Since sovereign CDS spreads and bank CDS spreads are simultaneously determined, we follow
Kallestrup (2011) and construct a measure which captures the part of sovereign risk, which is not related to the banking sector.
We regress sovereign CDS premiums on a number of explanatory variables of sovereign credit risk. The explanatory variables
include traditional ﬁscal variables such as gross or net general government debt (in domestic and foreign currency), short-term
and long-term external debt and the government primary balance (i.e. total revenue less expenditure excluding gross interest
payments) scaled against the domestic GDP. As macro-ﬁnancial variables we include real GDP, the unemployment rate, the cur-
rent account level and the net international investment position as percentage of GDP. Three variables signiﬁcant in the regression
of sovereign CDS premiums on the explanatory variables are government debt, long-term external debt, and the current account
balance. The ﬁtted value of the sovereign CDS spread from this regression, S_RISK, captures changes in sovereign credit risk arising
from changes in ﬁscal fundamentals.
3.4. Global variables
We include a number of global variables that have been used in other works to explain movements in sovereign credit
spreads, see for example Longstaff et al. (2011). The variables we use are the following:
• Excess return for the US stock market — computed as the difference between the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ stocks (from CRSP) and the three-month treasury bill.
• Percentage changes in the 5 year constant maturity treasury yields.
• Percentage changes in the corporate yield spreads. The investment-grade yield spreads are computed on the basis-point yield
spread between BBB and AAA industrial bond indices. The percentage changes in high-yield spreads are computed for the
basis-point yield spread between BB and BBB industrial bond indexes. The used indices represent average yields of a broad
cross-section of noncallable AAA-, BBB-, and BB-rated bonds with maturities approximately equal to 5 years.
• The volatility risk premium. This is computed as the difference between the VIX index and the realized volatility for the S&P 500
index over the preceding 3 months.
• Percentage changes in the LIBOR–OIS spread which measures the difference between unsecured bank lending rates and
comparable swap rates that have a very limited credit risk component.
• Itraxx SovX Western Europe comprising 15 names from the Eurozone region plus Denmark, Norway, Sweden and United
Kingdom that trade on Western European documentation. All constituents are equally weighted and we use a computed
theoretical price based on individual CDS premiums before the start of trading on 28 September 2009.
• The Markit iTraxx Non-Financials index comprising 100 equally-weighted European entities and the Markit iTraxx Senior
Financials index which comprises 25 equally-weighted European entities. For both indices the underlying reference obligations
are senior unsecured debt.
4. The risk-weighted exposure matrix
The key data describing the ﬁnancial sector linkages are summarized in what we label as the BIS exposure matrix. We now
describe how this is used together with CDS premiums to construct our risk measure for the major banks in each country.4
The consolidated banking statistics from BIS provide consolidated foreign claims of a national banking system in one country
on all residents (i.e. public sector, banks and the non-bank private sector) of other countries. For example, the size of exposures of
Austrian banks to residents of Hungary represents the aggregate claims of all Austrian-owned bank branches and subsidiaries
around the world on all residents of Hungary, i.e. public sector, banks and the non-bank private sector. We have an aggregate ex-
posure rather than the precise exposures of the Austrian banking system to each of these three categories. Other BIS statistics tell
us that in Q4:2010, the total claims held by BIS reporting banks outside of Hungary were split among 10% claims on Hungarian
banks, 30% claims on the Hungarian public sector and 60% claims on the non-bank private sector in Hungary. There is a very sig-
niﬁcant portion of non-bank private debt. The pattern is conﬁrmed by the ﬁgures on all the countries in the world. In Q4:2010,
the foreign claims of BIS reporting banks were split between approximately 23% claims on banks, 19% on the claims public sector
and 58% claims on the non-bank private sector.
To construct our measure of riskiness of foreign exposures, we will use data for the size of the exposures and for the risk of the
exposures. The data on the size of the exposures comes from BIS consolidated banking statistics. The riskiness of the exposures is4 We use BIS consolidated statistics with residency of the ultimate obligor when available. There are some holes in the data, most notable prior to 2005, which are
ﬁlled with foreign exposures on an immediate risk basis. The ultimate obligor refers to the counterparty who is ultimately responsible for servicing any outstanding
obligations in the event of a default by the immediate borrower. Suppose that an Austrian bank extends a loan to a company based in Hungary and the loan is guaran-
teed by a US bank. On an immediate borrower basis, the loan would be considered a claim of an Austrian bank on Hungary, as the immediate borrower resides in
Hungary. On anultimate risk basis, however, the loanwould be regarded as a claim of an Austrian bank on theUnited States, since that iswhere theultimate risk resides.
We do not include foreign exposures via derivativemarkets, and guarantee extended and credit commitments as the data are not available for individual countries be-
fore December 2010. It is only for US banks that these other potential exposures account for a very large part of total foreign exposures. Our econometric results are
robust to making pro-rate adjustments for these other potential exposures in foreign claims.
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well be to countries outside the sample. We need to have CDS data available for the banks or sovereigns for those other
countries. Thus, countries that do not report to the BIS, like Korea and Iceland, are not in our sample of the 17 countries,
but we are able to measure the riskiness of exposures to those two countries, since there are CDS data available for their
largest banks.
We include foreign exposures of a country's banks until we have reached 85% of the total foreign exposure, as this
eliminates the need to deal with countries for which a time series of CDS premiums is not available for the sovereign or
the largest banks. To clarify exactly how our measure is constructed, consider the case of Austria. First, we list the countries
to which the banks in Austria are exposed and order the countries by the size of the average exposure over the sample
period. We then select enough countries so that the exposure in Q4:2010 is at least 85% of the total exposure. This creates
a list of countries to which the banks in Austria have the most signiﬁcant exposures in that quarter, and we use this list
throughout the sample period. Table 1 shows the 19 countries which account for at least 85% of the total foreign exposure.
The remaining exposures are collected under ‘others’. The table lists each aggregate foreign exposure, as it was reported in
Q4:2010. For example, the exposure to Germany was USD 42.9 bn on average throughout the entire period and it was USD
48.2 bn in Q4:2010. The list is ordered according to the largest average exposure over the sample period. At the end of Q4
2010, the total foreign exposure of the Austrian banking system was USD 468.7 bn and the exposure to Germany accounted
for roughly 10% of this.
We measure the riskiness of the foreign exposures by weighing each exposure with an appropriate CDS spread. If available, we
use average bank CDS spreads for the two largest banks in the country of the exposure. The idea is that the riskiness of the private
sector exposures in a given country is reﬂected in the CDS spreads of the largest banks in that country. At the end of Q4, the
average CDS premium for the two largest banks in Germany was 126 bps. Since the exposure to Germany is 10%, this means a
risk-weighted value of 12.6 bp. When bank CDS spreads are not available for the risk weighting of exposures, as is typically
the case for emerging markets, we use the sovereign CDS spreads instead. In emerging markets, a large part of the riskiness of
an exposure is related to political and currency risk, risks that are also reﬂected in the sovereign CDS spreads. Empirical results
in Dittmar and Yuan (2008) conﬁrm the strong correlation between corporate credit spreads and sovereign credit spreads in
emerging markets. The risk-weighted sum of CDS spreads for all countries to which Austria is exposed is 163 basis points. The
weights of the countries in the exposure matrix only sum to 0.86. Hence the weighted average CDS spread of the exposures
that enter the sample is 1/0.86 × 163 bps = 190 bps. Note that this measure is a risk-weighted average of Austrian banks'
exposure to other countries in Q4:2010.
The measure changes through time as the weights of the exposures shift between countries and as the CDS spreads for the
countries change. The risk-weighted foreign exposure is only expected to matter if the size of the exposure is large enough
relative to other exposures. As shown in Table 2 the total exposure of the Austrian banking system is USD 1010 bn, i.e. the foreign
exposures account for almost half of the total exposure.
Table A.2 shows summary statistics on foreign exposures for each of the 17 countries. The table shows the relative size and the
(foreign) country of the largest exposure. It also shows the standard deviation of the time-series variation in the relative size of
the largest exposure. This standard deviation ranges from 0.02 to 0.1. While this does show some time-series variation inTable 1
The foreign exposurematrix: Austria. The table shows the exposures to the countries towardwhich theAustrian banking systemhas its 19 largest exposures until 85%of
the exposures are accounted for. There is no liquid historical CDS spread on Serbia (RS) and we thus use the one on Croatia (HR).
Rank Country Average (USD bn) Q42010 (USD bn) Share Acc Spread Type Share × CDS
1 DE 42.9 48.2 0.10 0.10 126 Bank 13
2 CZ 34.8 59.6 0.13 0.23 91 Sov 12
3 HU 23.2 35.0 0.07 0.34 378 Sov 28
4 RO 23.1 39.5 0.08 0.42 297 Sov 25
5 GB 21.6 15.8 0.03 0.26 169 Bank 6
6 HR 19.5 31.3 0.07 0.49 256 Sov 17
7 SK 18.8 27.9 0.06 0.55 82 Sov 5
8 US 17.4 16.3 0.03 0.58 132 Bank 5
9 IT 17.1 22.2 0.05 0.63 176 Bank 8
10 RU 11.0 15.2 0.03 0.66 147 Sov 5
11 NE 10.8 15.7 0.03 0.70 113 Bank 4
12 PL 9.6 14.3 0.03 0.73 144 Sov 4
13 SI 8.4 15.4 0.03 0.80 77 Sov 3
14 FR 8.3 9.3 0.02 0.75 142 Bank 3
15 RS 7.7 7.0 0.01 0.76 256 Sov 4
16 CH 7.7 11.2 0.02 0.82 100 Bank 2
17 UA 6.1 8.8 0.02 0.84 510 Sov 10
18 IE 6.0 2.9 0.01 0.83 1052 Bank 6
19 ES 5.5 6.7 0.01 0.86 259 Bank 4
– Others – 66.3 0.14 1.00 – – –
– Total – 468.7 1.00 1.00 – – 163
Table 2
The total exposure: Austria. The table shows the composition of assets for Austrian banks. The claims on the domestic sovereign include the domestic general govern-
ment and the central bank. Assets are reported both in nominal value and as percent of GDP.
Claims on USD bn % GDP Share
Non-nationals 468.7 124 0.46
Domestic sovereign 77.7 20 0.08
Other domestic residents 464.0 122 0.46
Total 1010.4 266 1.00
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addition, there is great geographical variation in the countries to which different banks are exposed.
The 5-year CDS spread for Austria depicted in Fig. 1 shows a clear covariation with the exposure measure. Our hypothesis is
that this covariation does not merely reﬂect common variation in all CDS spreads, but is rooted in economic fundamentals.
5. Bank foreign exposures and bank CDS dynamics
Our ﬁrst task is to investigate whether movement in our risk-weighted exposure measure is capable of explaining movements
in bank CDS spreads. Speciﬁcally, we analyze whether changes in the average of the CDS spreads of the two largest banks in a
country can be explained by a change in the relative size and the riskiness of foreign exposures as captured by our risk measure.
We start by running the following panel regression:Fig. 1. A
we hav
(CzechΔ B CDSð Þk;t ¼ αk;0 þ α1  Δ B BIS CDSð Þk;t
þ α02  Δ Local Bank Variablesð Þk;t
þ α03  Δ Global Variablesð Þt
þ α04  Δ CDS Indicesð Þt þ εk;tHere, Δ(B_CDS)k,t denotes the change from quarter t – 1 to t in average bank CDS spreads for country k. We follow this notation
throughout, so that Δ(B_BIS_CDS)k,t denotes the change in the exposure weighted credit spread for country k from quarter t− 1 to t.
Themeasure is constructed exactly as explained for the case of Austria in Section 4. Local bank variables are EDFmeasures for different
sectors. They control for the risk of domestic borrowers. Tomotivate our focus on EDFs, it is useful to consider the case of Spain. Spain's0
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seen in Fig. 2, there is an increase in CDS premiums for the largest Spanish banks in 2010 that is not explained entirely by the risk of
their foreign exposures. To measure the banks' risk from their exposure to domestic loans, we will use expected default frequency
(EDF) measures as proxies for this risk. Fig. 3 shows the dynamics of median ﬁrm EDFs in three sectors for Spain and Austria: banking,
non-ﬁnancial corporates and for the real estate sector. While the EDFs for both the corporate sector and the real estate sectors increase
for Austria, they are at a higher level over the last 2 years of the sample in Spain,which sees a very large spike in the real estate EDFs and
also a higher level of corporate EDFs thanAustria. The spike in bank EDFs in Spain is very large and in combination, Figs. 1–3 suggest that
the spike in CDS spreads of Spanish banks was much more driven by domestic factors and Austria's spike was much more driven by
foreign exposures.
In Austria, there is a high co-movement between the CDS spread for banks and the Austrian banks' foreign exposure-
weighted CDS spreads. It indicates that Austrian banks were hit by a shock originating abroad, especially in Eastern
Europe. On the contrary, in Spain we see a low co-movement, indicating that the credit risk primarily originated in the do-
mestic economy.
Global variables are a vector of variables listed in Section 3.4. Finally, since our exposure measure uses information from CDS
markets, we need to control for general movements in CDS spreads. We do it by including three general European CDS indices:
The iTraxx Sovereign Western Europe, iTraxx Senior Financials and iTraxx Non-Financials. They are used in the regression directly,
and in a two-step procedure. In the two-step procedure, we regress our exposure measure on the three indices and then we use
the residual as explanatory variable. The idea is to extract the part of our exposure measure, which is not captured by common
CDS movements. The regression uses ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors and ﬁxed effects. The result is
reported in Table B.1. Column I of this table presents the result of the regression without the CDS indices to emphasize the
important role of controlling for common movements in the CDS markets.
The exposure-weighted credit spread is highly signiﬁcant both when we control with the indices directly (column II) and
when we use the residuals (column III). In the regression which includes the indices as controls directly, a 100 basis point
increase in the exposure-weighted credit spread corresponds to a 52 basis point increase in the average bank CDS spreads. Inter-
estingly, we cannot show that this effect is signiﬁcantly weaker in the period leading up to the crisis, even if the regression co-
efﬁcient (column IV) is estimated to be smaller in the ﬁrst part of the sample. The real estate EDF measure, R2_EDF, which
measures median default probabilities in the real estate sector (broadly deﬁned), is also highly signiﬁcant in all regressions,
which is consistent with the important role played by real estate in bank losses during the ﬁnancial crisis. In contrast, except
for S_RISK and the iTraxx index for senior ﬁnancials, none of the other local or global variables are signiﬁcant even at the 5%
level in the full sample. Surprisingly, the more general corporate EDF measure for the entire corporate sector, C2_EDF is not sig-
niﬁcant. This could be due to strong correlation with real estate EDFs. When we regress bank CDS premiums on the EDF measure
for the entire corporate sector, it is highly signiﬁcant.
One could argue that there are “second order effects” of foreign exposures in the following sense: German banks, for example,
have foreign exposures to Spain whose banks in turn have foreign exposures in Mexico. Should this count as a German exposure
to Mexico? Our numbers show that this effect is extremely small and can be ignored. For example, German banks have 44% of
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Fig. 3. Bank, corporate and real estate EDFs for Austria and Spain. Austrian banks exposed to some increase in real estate and corporate risk, but the order of
magnitude is far from that of Spain. Green: Real estate 5-year EDFs; Blueish: Bank 5-year EDFs; Red: Non-bank corporate 5-year EDFs.
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Spanish banks have 28% of their assets in foreign assets, and of those 10% are to Mexico. In the extreme case that all German
banks' foreign exposures were to Spanish banks, the total exposure to Mexico would be 0.07% of German bank assets. The actual
number is of course signiﬁcantly smaller, since a large part of German bank exposures to Spain is to the Spanish government and
private borrowers with no exposure to Mexico.
In a similar vein, one could worry about feedback loops. A strong candidate for such worries would be the case of the UK and
the USA. UK banks have 27% of their foreign exposures to the USA. Foreign exposures of US banks account for 10% of their assets,
and of those foreign exposures, 19% are to the UK. Thus, in the extreme case, where all UK foreign exposures to the USA were
exposures to banks, and all foreign exposures of US banks to the UK were to UK banks, the ‘feedback’ exposure of UK banks to
themselves would only account for 0.5% of foreign exposures, or 0.25% of total assets. The true number is likely to be much
smaller, because a large part of UK banks' exposures to the USA are to non-bank entities (private borrowers and US government
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matrix.
5.1. Robustness checks
We perform several robustness checks to ﬁrmly establish that the cross-border exposures of banks are signiﬁcant in explaining
the dynamics of bank CDS spreads.
First, we replace all global factors by a time ﬁxed effect and run a regression on the country speciﬁc explanatory variables
that include EDF measures and measures of domestic sovereign risk. The time ﬁxed effects are included as we may still have
left out an important factor which jointly determines the level of CDS spreads across banks. The results are reported in
Table B.2. Our measure of ﬁnancial exposures is still signiﬁcant over the full sample and in the subsample that begins
with the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis. Similarly, the country-speciﬁc EDFs and the sovereign risk measure are both signiﬁcant
throughout the sample as well as in the second period, although the real estate EDF is weakly signiﬁcant in the period before
the crisis as well.
Second, it is possible that the results are driven by a few countries in our panel which have a large fraction of their assets
in foreign exposures. We divide the sample in two parts according to the average size of foreign exposures (relative to total
assets) over the sample period. In the sample of countries whose banks have high foreign exposures compared to assets, the
lowest average exposure is that of Great Britain with 42% and the highest is that of Switzerland with 71%. In the sample with
low foreign exposures compared to assets, the highest is that of Spain with an average of 28% and the lowest is that of the
USA with 11%. As seen in Table B.3, we ﬁnd that in both subsamples our dynamic exposure measure is signiﬁcant in
explaining the dynamics of bank CDS spreads. We also leave out the USA from the sample because of the potential special
status of the US economy in affecting global CDS spreads. Excluding the USA does not change our results, as seen in the last
column of Table B.3.
Third, even when we divide in subsamples of countries with high and low foreign exposure, the range covered in each group
is quite high. More generally, the distribution of bank assets on domestic sovereign, domestic private and foreign exposures varies
considerably across countries. We therefore deﬁneB1 ¼ Foreign claims
Bank assets
B2 ¼ Domestic credit
Bank assets
B3 ¼ Claims on sovereign
Bank assetsand use B1 × Δ(B_BIS_CDS)k,t, B2 × Δ(EDF_ALL)k,t, and B3 × Δ(S_RISK)k,t as regressors. We report the results in Table B.4. Note
that the coefﬁcient on B1 × Δ(B_BIS_CDS)k,t is now 1.22, but since B1 is on average 0.379, the effect of changes in the exposure
matrix is the same as before. The advantage of the weighting scheme is that it allows us to differentiate the impact of changes in
the exposure measure between countries with different exposures. For example, a 1 basis point increase in our foreign exposure
measure translates into a 0.88 bp increase for Switzerland, and a 0.13 bp increase for the USA. Also, we note that the effect of
foreign exposures clearly dominates the effect of both types of domestic exposures. Speciﬁcally, a 1 standard deviation change
in B_BIS_CDS on average translates into a 29 bp change in bank CDS premia, a 1 standard deviation change in S_RISK on average
translates into a 9 bp change in bank CDS premia, and a 1 standard deviation change in EDF_ALL on average translates into an
8 bp change in bank CDS premia. Consistent with the new emphasis on bank holdings of sovereign risk in the recent crisis,
domestic sovereign risk is only signiﬁcant in the second part of our sample.
Fourth, in Table B.5 we test the relevance of the information in the BIS exposure matrix by running a regression in which
we leave out the ﬁve largest foreign exposures when we calculate the exposure measure for each country's banking system.
This new exposure measure is not able to explain variations in bank CDS spreads once we control with the CDS indices. This
jointly illustrates the importance of controlling for general movements in CDS markets and the signiﬁcance of our exposure
measure. When we remove the ﬁve biggest exposures, the exposure measure is signiﬁcant before controlling for the CDS in-
dices, but it loses signiﬁcance with the introduction of the indices. It is in contrast with our full exposure measure which
remains signiﬁcant even after including the indices. Thus, our exposure measure contains information that is reﬂected in
CDS premiums and which is not due to movements in indices or other global variables. Note that it is not the case that
the GIIPS countries are consistently among the top ﬁve exposures. In fact, only ﬁve countries (France, Germany, UK,
Portugal and Spain) in our sample have their most important exposures to GIIPS countries. Also note that when running
this placebo test, we rescale the exposure measures so that the coefﬁcients on our measure and the placebo measure
become comparable. The problem is that when we leave out the ﬁve biggest exposures, the exposure measure becomes
smaller simply because we have removed a weighted sum of ﬁve CDS spreads. Thus, if our exposure measure is based on
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by dividing by 0.85 and the second measure by 0.3.
Last, in Table B.6 we perform a few additional robustness tests. We show that using equal weights on the exposures instead of
weighing by exposure size also gives a signiﬁcant exposure measure. Thus the most important part of our exposure measure is
selecting the countries to which a banking system is exposed. We choose to work with the actual weights as this is less ad
hoc than using equal weights. In unreported tests, we checked that a concentration measure (such as a Herﬁndahl index) does
not help us explain the variations in bank CDS spreads. This conﬁrms that the detailed composition of the weights is less impor-
tant than accounting for the largest exposures. We also run a regression in which we use sovereign CDS premiums to measure the
riskiness of exposures in all countries — and not just those for which we have limited or no information on bank CDS spreads. The
results are reported in columns IV–VI in Table B.6. Again the signiﬁcance of the exposure measure is not affected.
6. Sovereign CDS spreads and contingent liabilities
So far we have considered the asset side of the banks' balance sheets focusing on measures of asset quality that include ﬁnan-
cial linkages, and we have shown that they can help explain bank risk as measured by CDS premia. Implicit and explicit govern-
ment guarantees imply that bank risk plays a huge role on the liability side of sovereign's balance sheet. In this section, we show
that bank risk is a signiﬁcant factor in the determination of sovereign credit spreads. The regression now has the following
form:5 The
included
6 The
fore weΔ S CDSð Þk;t ¼ αk;0 þ α01  Δ Domestic Government Variablesð Þk;t
þ α02  Guaranteesð Þk;t
þ α03  Δ Global Variablesð Þt þ εk;twhere global variables and domestic government variables are deﬁned above. The ﬁscal variables are traditionally viewed as de-
terminants of sovereign default risk. The term “guarantees” refers to variables seeking to measure the size and riskiness of implicit
and explicit guarantees made to the domestic banking system. The explicit guarantee (labeled guarantees in Table B.7) is a var-
iable which is only active (i.e. non-zero) in quarters where a country has issued an explicit guarantee on parts of banks' liabilities,
i.e. the dummy is active in the quarter in which the guarantee is issued and zero otherwise.5 When this is the case, the variable
takes on a value equal to the size of the guarantee relative to GDP, as reported by IMF (2009). For all countries, this guarantee is
made in Q4:2008.6
We have two additional variables seeking to measure the size of the sovereign's ‘contingent liability’ on the banking
sector. The ﬁrst variable is the size of the domestic banking system (measured as claims on domestic entities and non-
nationals) relative to GDP multiplied by the average CDS premium of the two largest banks. This measure combines the
size of the potential liability and its riskiness into one measure. The second variable uses median bank EDF instead of
bank CDS to measure riskiness.
Columns I and II of Table B.7 report the result of the regression when we use the CDS-based measure for the size of the im-
plicit guarantee. Column I does not include the Q4:2008 explicit guarantees, whereas column II does. Both implicit and explicit
guarantees are highly signiﬁcant. In columns III and IV the riskiness of implicit guarantees is measured using EDFs. Again, both
implicit and explicit guarantees are highly signiﬁcant. In all four regressions, the excess return on the US equity market, and
changes in yield spreads on investment grade and high yield bonds are not signiﬁcant which is in contrast to the ﬁndings in
Longstaff et al. (2011). This may be because we include CDS indices as our explanatory variables.
Column V addresses the possibility of endogeneity of bank CDS premia, i.e. that sovereign and bank CDS are determined joint-
ly. To demonstrate that bank CDS premiums do indeed inﬂuence sovereign CDS premia, we choose as an instrument for bank
credit risk the amount of short-term central bank funding of banks — typically done through collateralized lending. The idea is
that increases in central bank funding are a sign of increased bank credit risk, but unrelated to sovereign risk through any
other channel. It is conceivable that the increase in central bank funding was part of a plan to support bank purchases of sover-
eign debt and hence the increase in bank funding was spurred by sovereign risk. We follow Kallestrup (2011) and include a
Granger causality test to check the direction of causality. We ﬁnd evidence that changes in central bank funding Granger cause
bank and sovereign CDS spreads (with t-statistics of 2.43 and 1.693 respectively), but we ﬁnd no evidence that sovereign or
bank CDS spreads Granger cause central bank funding (t-statistics of 0.09 and 1.3 respectively). This supports our use of central
bank funding as an instrument for bank credit risk. It should be noted that the 3-year LTRO programs introduced by the ECB at the
end of 2011 and in 2012, which for example lead to Italian and Spanish banks increasing their exposure to the domestic sovereign
are not in our sample period. See Acharya and Steffen (2015) for more on this.re have beenmany types of ﬁnancial support schemes, such as capital injections, purchases of assets, central bank support and liquidity provisions. These are not
here.
guarantee on the Irish banking systemwas given in September 29 and in force in September 30. The price impact seems to mostly take place in Q4, and there-
have used this as the relevant quarter for Ireland also.
384 R. Kallestrup et al. / Journal of Empirical Finance 38 (2016) 374–393With this instrument, we ﬁnd that the current long-term government liabilities are signiﬁcant. The negative sign on the
LIBOR–OIS spread is somewhat puzzling. An increase in this variable should indicate an increase in general bank credit risk and
we would therefore expect a positive sign of the regression coefﬁcient. The reason may be that the LIBOR–OIS spread and the
yield spreads of corporate bonds are correlated. Unsurprisingly, the general level of sovereign credit risk as measured by iTraxx
sovereign index is signiﬁcant.
Was the importance of implicit guarantees already priced in the sovereign CDS market before the crisis? To investigate this
question, we have split our sample into two sub-periods and ﬁnd the results reported in Table B.8. Before the crisis, the sovereign
CDS spreads are not inﬂuenced by the implicit guarantees as measured through the size and riskiness of the domestic banking
system. This result is conﬁrmed in the last three columns of Table B.8 where we used a general time-ﬁxed effect instead of the
CDS indices to control for common, global factors in CDS spreads.
As a robustness test, we rerun all regressions pertaining to sovereign risk using the average leverage of the two largest banks,
as an instrument for bank risk. The results are presented in Table B.9. They are robust and consistent with those obtained from
using short-term central bank funding of banks. Bank leverage ratios are shown by Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013) to be a stronger
predictor of bank equity returns during the crisis than measures of capitalization using risk-weighted assets. Higher leverage is
associated with a higher risk of poor bank performance, and this risk is likely a consequence of a higher risk level chosen by
the bank and not related to the state of the sovereign. We view the use of leverage as instrument mainly as a robustness
check since statistical tests show that it is a weak instrument. The F-statistic of the ﬁrst stage regressions is much higher for
the short-term central bank funding of banks than for bank leverage.
At this point, we have strong evidence that bank CDS spreads are affected by foreign exposures of banks and that the risk of
banks in turn spills over to sovereign CDS spreads. This provides a strong case for arguing, that the evolution of sovereign CDS
spreads is affected by the foreign exposures of domestic banking systems, thus establishing a concrete and measurable source
of covariation between sovereign spreads.
Our ﬁnal goal is to examine whether this effect materializes itself in a direct regression of sovereign CDS spreads on measures
for the riskiness of banking fundamentals, EDFs and our BIS exposure measure. Table B.10 shows that sovereign CDS spreads are
affected by the risk of bank exposures as measured through our BIS measure and through EDFs. This is true whether we control
for global variables and CDS indices (column I) or use time-ﬁxed effects (column II). An increase of 1 standard deviation in the BIS
exposure measure leads to an increase of 24 basis points in the sovereign CDS spreads, i.e. about one quarter of the standard
deviation. An increase of 1 standard deviation in the median EDF leads to an increase of 40 basis points in the sovereign CDS
spreads. Longstaff et al. (2011) found that the performance of the national stock market is not very important in explaining
movements in the sovereign CDS spreads. Our ﬁndings suggest that the inﬂuence on sovereign CDS premiums from the domestic
economy is better captured through the risk of the banking sector. This is consistent with the fact that all countries in our sample
have a very large banking sector compared to their GDP. Indeed, the size of the domestic banking system (measured as claims on
domestic entities and non-nationals) relative to GDP has a median of 259% of the GDP. The minimum is 93% for USA in 2004 and
the maximum is 800% of the GDP for Switzerland in 2008. The signiﬁcance of EDFs and of our BIS measure shows that the risk-
iness of the local banking systems has both a domestic and a foreign component. The inﬂuence on sovereign CDS premiums of the
foreign exposures of banks is clear evidence that bank risk affects sovereign risk irrespective of any feedback loops that may arise
due to bank holdings of domestic sovereign bonds.7. Conclusion
We use BIS consolidated banking statistics to construct a simple risk-weighted measure of foreign exposures of banking
systems in 17 countries. Our measure captures in a simple way how the foreign asset holdings of the largest banks are an important
determinant not only of their own CDS premiums, but also of the CDS premium of the sovereign in which the banks reside. Extensive
robustness checks conﬁrm that the signiﬁcance of our measure cannot be attributed to common variation in CDS spreads.
It is to be expected that the riskiness of a bank's assets affects the CDS premium of the bank, but the degree to which the CDS
market captures this is remarkable and it is conceivable that risk management practice and banking regulation are also playing a
role. A common practice among hedge funds and risk managers is to hedge exposures through ‘proxy hedging’ — i.e. hedging
through correlated but ‘cheaper’ hedging vehicles (see e.g. IMF, 2010 and Association for Financial Markets in Europe, 2011).
For example, a bank may wish to hedge emerging market credit risk in Eastern Europe, either because it has exposure to sover-
eigns itself (as a direct exposure or as counterparty risk in large derivative contracts) or because it wishes to hedge a large loan
exposure in such countries using a ‘macro’ hedge. Buying protection on Austrian banks which are known to have large exposures
in these countries may provide a cheaper hedge. Similarly, an exposure to a major bank can be a ‘proxy’ hedged using a CDS on
the sovereign in which the bank resides. Furthermore, in the latter part of our sample period, Basel III rules begin to encourage
banks to use CDS contracts to hedge changes in credit value adjustments (CVA), i.e. adjustments in the value of derivative posi-
tions due to counterparty credit risk. The hedge can be done either through a CDS contract referencing the speciﬁc counterparty
or through a proxy hedge on a sovereign when the CDS is not available. Our ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis that CDS
premiums reﬂect the value of CDS contracts in providing capital relief for ﬁnancial institutions, see for example Yorulmazer
(2012) and Klingler and Lando (2015).
In light of the statistics made public by the European Banking Association after its 2010 stress tests of European banks which
document the dominant role played by private foreign exposures, our ﬁndings support the recent recommendation in the October
385R. Kallestrup et al. / Journal of Empirical Finance 38 (2016) 374–3932013 IMF Global Financial Stability Report, which“the ECB's upcoming bank balance sheet assessment should, among other things,
focus on corporate exposures”, see IMF (2013).
Appendix A. Summary statistics and variable descriptionTable A.1
Banking groups as percentage of GDP, 2009. The table lists the largest banks in each country used to ﬁnd the average bank CDS spread.
Size of bank GDP
Country Bank name USD bn USD bn % GDP
AT Erste Group Bank AG 291 382 76
AT Raiffeisen Zentralbank Oesterreich AG 213 382 56
AU National Australian Bank 576 994 58
AU Westpac 519 994 52
BE Dexia Group NV 832 472 176
BE KBC Group NV 467 472 99
CH UBS AG 1301 492 264
CH Credit Suisse Group AG 1001 492 203
DE Deutsche Bank AG 2162 3339 65
DE Commerzbank AG 1216 3339 36
DK Danske Bank AS 597 310 193
ES Banco Santander SA 1600 1468 109
ES Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA 771 1468 53
FR BNP Paribas 2964 2656 112
FR Crédit Agricole-Crédit Agricole Group 2440 2656 92
GB Royal Bank of Scotland Plc 2749 2179 126
GB Barclays Bank Plc 2234 2179 103
GR National Bank of Greece SA 163 331 49
GR EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA 121 331 37
IE Bank of Ireland Plc 261 222 117
IE Allied Irish Banks Plc 251 222 113
IT Unicredit SpA 1338 2118 63
IT Intesa Sanpaolo SpA 900 2118 42
JP Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group 1930 5069 38
JP Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group 1144 5069 23
NE ING Group NV 1676 797 210
NE Rabobank 875 797 110
PT Banco Comercial Portugues SA 138 233 59
PT Banco Espirito Santo SA 119 233 51
SE Nordea Bank AB 731 406 180
SE Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 324 406 80
US Bank of America Corporation 2223 14,119 16
US JP Morgan Chase Co. 2032 14,119 14
Table A.2
Summary statistics: foreign exposures. The table shows the relative size and the country of the largest exposure. It also displays the time-series variation in the relative
size of the largest exposure. Source: Bank for International Settlements and own calculations. Exposure data for Ireland exists from 2006 to 2010.
Country Share of exposure explained
in Q4 2010
Countries included Maximum exposure Country with maximum
exposure
Standard deviation
of maximum exposure
AT 0.86 19 0.16 DE 0.02
AU 0.87 9 0.49 NZ 0.02
BE 0.87 13 0.63 NE 0.02
CH 0.85 17 0.51 US 0.04
DE 0.85 32 0.24 GB 0.03
DK 0.86 7 0.29 GB 0.02
ES 0.86 9 0.36 GB 0.04
FR 0.86 25 0.27 US 0.03
GB 0.86 20 0.36 US 0.03
GR 0.85 13 0.31 TR 0.05
IE 0.85 9 0.39 GB 0.03
IT 0.85 19 0.35 DE 0.10
JP 0.86 16 0.47 US 0.02
NE 0.88 13 0.28 US 0.04
PT 0.86 16 0.21 ES 0.02
SE 0.85 9 0.28 DK 0.04
US 0.85 19 0.23 GB 0.03
Table A.3
Variable description.
Variable Description Source
B_GDP Aggregates data regarding: IFS & BIS
• banks' claims on domestic central bank (percent of GDP);
• banks' claims on domestic general government (percent of GDP);
• banks' claims on other sectors in the country (percent of GDP);
• banks' claims on non-nationals (percent of GDP)
B_CREDIT Banks' claims on other sectors in the country. Percent of GDP IFS
B_EDF Median of the 5-year EDFs for the banking sector Moody's KMV
B_FExp Banks' claims on non-nationals. Percent of GDP BIS
B_CB_L Banks' liabilities to the domestic central bank. Percent of GDP IFSand the Bank of England
Leverage Average of the banks' leverage. It is computed as total regulatory capital/total assets. Bankscope & IFS
B_CDS Average of 5-year CDS on domestic banks CMA and Fitch CDS Pricing
B_BIS_CDS Exposure-weighted credit spread computed using both sovereign and bank CDS data. See the main text BIS
B_BIS_RES A ﬁtted value from a regression of B_BIS_CDS on the CDS indices B_FINSNR, F_NONFIN, and S_SOVX Own calculations
B_BIS_NOT5 Exposure-weighted credit spread computed using both sovereign and bank CDS data, but leaving out the
largest 5 exposures. See the main text.
BIS
BIS_NOT5_RES A ﬁtted value from a regression of B_BIS_NOT5 on the CDS indices B_FINSNR, F_NONFIN, and S_SOVX Own calculations
B_EQUAL_CDS Equally-weighted credit spread computed using both sovereign and bank CDS data. We use the BIS data
to select which countries to include in the measure but allow the weights to be equal. See the main text.
BIS
B_EQUAL_RES A ﬁtted value from a regression of B_EQUAL_CDS on the CDS indices B_FINSNR, F_NONFIN, and S_SOVX Own calculations
B1 The share of banks' claims on foreigners computed as the ratio between claims on foreigners and bank assets IFS & BIS
B2 The share of banks' claims on the domestic residents computed as the ratio between the domestic credit and
bank assets
IFS & BIS
B3 The share of banks' claims on the domestic sovereign computed as the ratio between the claims on sovereign
and bank assets
IFS & BIS
C2_EDF Median of the 5-year EDFs for domestic corporate sector Moody's KMV
R2_EDF Median of the 5-year EDFs for real estate ﬁrms, real estate investment ﬁrms and construction ﬁrms Moody's KMV
EDF_ALL Median of the 5-year EDFs for the domestic corporate sector, as well as real estate ﬁrms, real estate investment
ﬁrms and construction ﬁrms
Moody's KMV
GUARANTEES Sovereign guarantees to the banking sector See IMF (2009)
M_CA Current account (seasonally adjusted). Percent of GDP OECD, and IFS
S_IRN_REV* General government net interest expenditure to revenue Fitch, Eurostat, IMF, OECD and IFS
S_RISK A ﬁtted value from a regression of sovereign CDS spread on general government gross debt to GDP,
long-term external debt, and the current account
See Kallestrup (2011)
S_BIS_CDS Exposure-weighted credit spread computed using sovereign CDS data. See the main text. BIS
S_BIS_RES A ﬁtted value from a regression of S_BIS_CDS on the CDS indices B_FINSNR, F_NONFIN, and S_SOVX Own calculations
S_CDS The 5-year sovereign CDS spread CMA and Fitch CDS Pricing
S_DEBT_GDP* General government gross debt to GDP Eurostat, OECD and IFS
S_FDEF_GDP* The quarterly lending revision is calculated as the sum of the most recent year-end and year-ahead
budget projection by the OECD or the IMF minus the second most recent forecast for the same period
provided by the same organization. In quarters where they do not update a new budget projection we
interpolate a forecast.
OECD EO and IMF WEO
S_GEXT_L General government's long-term external liabilities. Percent of GDP QEDS
B_FINSNR The Markit iTraxx Senior Financials index comprises 25 equally-weighted European names. J.P. Morgan: DataQuery
F_NONFIN The Markit iTraxx Non-Financials index comprises 100 equally-weighted European names. J.P. Morgan: DataQuery
S_SOVX The 5-year Itraxx SovX Western Europe index comprises 15 sovereign names where all constituents are
equally weighted (It is a theoretical price before the start of trading on 28 September 2009).
J.P. Morgan: DataQuery
VPSPX Volatility risk premium. Computed as the difference between the VIX index and the realized volatility
for the S&P 500 index over the preceding 3 months
Bloomberg
ER3M Excess return for the US Stock Market. It is computed as the difference between the value-weighted
return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks and the three-month treasury-bill return.
Bloomberg. The Center for
Research in Security Prices
%Δ(OISUS) Percentage change in the 3 month US LIBOR–OIS spread Bloomberg
%Δ(5YCMT) Percentage change in the 5 year constant maturity treasury yields Federal Reserve/Bloomberg
%Δ(HY) Percentage change in the US corporate yield spreads. The investment-grade yield spreads are computed on
the basis-point yield spread between BBB and AAA industrial bond indices. The percentage changes in high-
yield spreads are computed for the basis-point yield. The used indices represent average yields of a broad
cross-section of noncallable AAA-, BBB-, and BB-rated bonds with maturities approximately equal to 5 years.
Bloomberg
%Δ(IG) Percentage change in the US corporate yield spreads. Spread between BB and BBB industrial bond
indexes. See above.
Bloomberg
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Table B.1
Regressing bank CDS spreads on exposure-weighted spreads. This table reports the coefﬁcients and t-statistics for the panel regression:
Δ B CDSð Þk;t ¼ αk;0 þ α1  Δ B BIS CDSð Þk;t þ α02  Δ Local Bank Variablesð Þk;t
þ α03  Δ Global Variablesð Þt þ α04  Δ CDS Indicesð Þt þ εk;t
whereΔ(•) and %Δ(•) stand forﬁrst difference andpercentage change of the variable over the quarter, respectively. k is the index for countries and t is the index for time.
In column II, we simply introduce the indexes along the BIS matrix. In column III, we have regressed the BIS matrix on the CDS indices and used the residuals from this
regression as a variable to explain the CDS spreads. Column IV allows for a different response in the market before and after the last quarter of 2007 by introducing a
dummy variable for the period between the ﬁrst quarter 2004 and the last quarter 2007. All equations are estimated by OLS with robust standard errors and country
ﬁxed effects. The standard errors are corrected for both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
Variable I II III IV
Intercept −5.669 −7.258⁎ −6.173 −7.663
(−1.497) (−1.789) (−1.649) (−1.818)
Δ(B_BIS_CDS) 0.926*** 0.521⁎⁎⁎ 0.537⁎⁎⁎
(5.303) (4.252) (4.136)
Δ(B_BIS_CDS) × period 1 −0.593
(−1.587)
Δ(B_BIS_RES) 0.231⁎⁎
(2.717)
Δ(R2_EDF) 12.50⁎⁎⁎ 11.12⁎⁎⁎ 10.76⁎⁎⁎ 11.12⁎⁎⁎
(7.384) (8.244) (8.204) (8.358)
Δ(C2_EDF) −10.84 −9.652 −4.596 −10.27
(−0.540) (−0.481) (−0.186) (−0.520)
ER3M −75.80 12.09 −7.655 17.33
(−1.254) (0.189) (−0.117) (0.275)
VPSPX 1.657⁎⁎ 1.054 0.651 1.214
(2.147) (1.354) (0.791) (1.432)
%Δ5YCMT −8.898 −4.217 −6.882 −3.149
(−0.865) (−0.453) (−0.826) (−0.345)
%ΔHY −14.05 −4.231 13.81 4.443
(−1.007) (−0.571) (1.177) (0.765)
%ΔIG −4.372 9.724 0.415 12.126
(−0.440) (0.910) (0.038) (1.205)
%Δ(OISUS) 4.073 1.652 2.083 1.137
(1.634) (0.805) (0.958) (0.662)
S_RISK 0.869⁎⁎⁎ 0.774⁎⁎⁎ 0.766⁎⁎⁎ 0.180⁎⁎⁎
(3.063) (2.754) (2.782) (2.692)
Δ(S_SOVX) 0.206 0.211 0.180
(0.714) (0.718) (0.616)
Δ(F_NONFIN) 0.654 1.094 −0.266
(−0.966) (−1.258) (−1.245)
Δ(B_FINSNR) 0.654⁎⁎⁎ 1.094⁎⁎⁎ 0.678⁎⁎⁎
(2.678) (5.050) (2.845)
Adjusted R2 0.441 0.465 0.461 0.465
No. of observations 447 447 430 447
⁎⁎⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
⁎⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Table B.2
Time effects. This table reports the coefﬁcients and t-statistics for the panel regression:
Δ B CDSð Þk;t ¼ αk;0 þ α0;t þ α1  Δ B BIS CDSð Þk;t þ α02  Δ Local Bank Variablesð Þk;t
þ εk;t
whereΔ(•) and %Δ(•) stand forﬁrst difference and percentage change of the variable over the quarter, respectively. k is the index for countries and t is the index for time.We
perform the analysis ﬁrst for the whole sample from the ﬁrst quarter of 2004 to the last quarter of 2010. Afterward we perform the same analysis on sub-periods. All equa-
tions are estimatedbyOLSwith robust standard errors, and country and timeﬁxedeffects. The standard errors are corrected for bothheteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
Variables Full sample 2004 Q1–2007 Q4 2008 Q1–2010 Q4
Intercept 6.878⁎⁎⁎ 1.791⁎⁎⁎ 10.294⁎⁎⁎
(7.056) (8.708) (2.532)
Δ(B_BIS_CDS) 0.440⁎⁎⁎ 0.052 0.453⁎⁎⁎
(2.591) (0.675) (2.596)
Δ(R2_EDF) 11.458⁎⁎⁎ 1.016⁎ 12.491⁎⁎⁎
(8.652) (1.649) (8.685)
Δ(C2_EDF) 0.121 0.606 −18.183
(continued on next page)
Table B.2 (continued)
Variables Full sample 2004 Q1–2007 Q4 2008 Q1–2010 Q4
(0.004) (0.302) (−0.555)
Δ(S_RISK) 0.849⁎⁎⁎ 0.008 0.276⁎⁎⁎
(3.601) (0.389) (3.933)
Adjusted R2 0.453 0.675 0.457
No. of observations 447 243 204
⁎⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Table B.3
Countries with strong/weak connections. This table reports the coefﬁcients and t-statistics for the panel regression:
Δ B CDSð Þk;t ¼ αk;0 þ α1  Δ B BIS CDSð Þk;t þ α02  Δ Local Bank Variablesð Þk;t
þ α03  Δ Global Variablesð Þt þ α4  Δ CDS Financials Indexð Þt þ εk;t
whereΔ(•) and %Δ(•) stand forﬁrst difference andpercentage change of the variable over the quarter, respectively. k is the index for countries and t is the index for time.
We perform the analysis on three sub-groups: countrieswhose foreign exposure weights more than 40% of their portfolio, whose foreign exposure (FExp)weights less
than 40% of their portfolio and all the countries except the USA. In the ﬁrst group, we have Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, France, Great Britain, Ireland, the
Netherlands, and Sweden. In the second group, we have Australia, Denmark, Spain, Greece, Italy, Japan, Portugal, and the United States. All equations are estimated by
OLS with robust standard errors, and country ﬁxed effects. The standard errors are corrected for both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
Variable FExp ≥40% FExp ≤40% No USA
Intercept 1.259 −11.69⁎⁎⁎ −6.856⁎
(0.445) (−2.784) (−1.649)
Δ(B_BIS_CDS) 0.496⁎⁎ 0.5⁎⁎ 0.564⁎⁎⁎
(2.38) (2.01) (4.428)
Δ(R2_EDF) 13.36⁎⁎⁎ 2.908 11.38⁎⁎⁎
(10.16) (0.543) (7.413)
Δ(C2_EDF) −75.85⁎⁎⁎ 10.98 −13.04
(−4.403) (0.584) (−0.522)
ER3M 2.727 45.12 23.76
(0.05) (0.302) (0.388)
VPSPX −1.125⁎⁎ 2.096⁎ 1.205
(−2.109) (1.882) (1.466)
%Δ5YCMT 4.274 7.364 1.173
(0.273) (0.386) (0.088)
%ΔHY −19.3 13.27 −4.506
(−1.645) (0.717) (−0.394)
%ΔIG 21.61 −8.789 12.27
(1.593) (−0.39) (1.002)
%Δ(OISUS) 2.811 1.604 2.028
(1.161) (0.394) (0.871)
S_RISK 0.167 1.229⁎⁎⁎ 0.838⁎⁎⁎
(1.277) (4.477) (2.945)
Δ(B_FINSNR) 0.815⁎ 0.491⁎ 0.622⁎⁎
(1.796) (1.780) (2.470)
Adjusted R2 0.469 0.525 0.455
No. of observations 235 212 420
⁎⁎⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
⁎⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Table B.4
Allowing for different weights on the local variables and the BIS exposure matrix. This table reports the coefﬁcients and t-statistics for the panel regression:
Δ B CDSð Þk;t ¼ αk;0 þ α1  B1k;t  Δ B BIS CDSð Þk;t þ α2  B2k;tΔ 100 EDF ALLk;t
 
α3  B3k;t  S RISKk;t þ α04  Δ Global Variablesð Þt þ εk;t
whereΔ(•) and %Δ(•) stand forﬁrst difference andpercentage change of the variable over the quarter, respectively. k is the index for countries and t is the index for time.
We perform the analysis ﬁrst for the whole sample and on sub-periods. All equations are estimated by OLS with robust standard errors and country ﬁxed effects. The
standard errors are corrected for both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
Variable Full sample Q1 2004–Q4 2007 Q1 2008–Q4 2010
Intercept −5.871 −0.641 −8.047
(−1.625) (−1.416) (−1.260)
B1 × Δ(B_BIS_CDS) 1.225⁎⁎⁎ 0.413⁎ 1.250⁎⁎⁎
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Table B.4 (continued)
Variable Full sample Q1 2004–Q4 2007 Q1 2008–Q4 2010
(3.869) (1.874) (3.025)
B2 × Δ(100 × EDF_ALL) 0.175⁎⁎⁎ 0.018⁎⁎⁎ 0.187⁎⁎⁎
(3.052) (4.096) (2.747)
B3 × S_RISK 6.624⁎⁎ 0.072 9.535⁎⁎⁎
(2.078) (0.635) (3.049)
ER3M 20.12 25.98⁎⁎ 76.06
(0.258) (1.979) (0.666)
VPSPX 0.990 0.207 0.707
(1.458) (1.401) (0.419)
%Δ5YCMT −1.902 4.234⁎ 5.645
(−0.136) (1.875) (0.260)
%ΔHY −5.582 2.968⁎ −18.44
(−0.973) (1.827) (−0.253)
%ΔIG 8.658 1.491 7.387
(1.071) (1.194) (0.284)
%Δ(OISUS) 2.056 0.810⁎⁎ 12.03⁎⁎
(1.214) (2.585) (2.379)
Δ(S_SOVX) 0.200 1.886⁎⁎⁎ 0.024
(0.734) (2.908) (0.066)
Δ(F_NONFIN) −0.199 0.187⁎ 0.085
(−0.979) (1.676) (0.230)
Δ(B_FINSNR) 0.685⁎⁎⁎ 0.070 0.607⁎
(2.622) (0.604) (1.813)
Adjusted R2 0.499 0.663 0.542
No. of observations 447 243 204
⁎⁎⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
⁎⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Table B.5
Excluding the biggest 5 exposures. In columns I and II, we repeat the equations estimated in Table B.1 butwe are dividing the BISmatrix by the share of exposure explained.We
repeat the estimation using a BIS exposurematrix fromwhichwe have excluded the biggest 5 exposures, also weighting by the share of exposure explained by the newmatrix.
Variable I II III IV
Intercept −5.663 −7.255⁎⁎⁎ −5.181 −8.086⁎
(−1.498) (−1.789) (−1.289) (−1.955)
Δ(B_BIS_CDS)/SHARE 0.794⁎⁎⁎ 0.449⁎⁎⁎
(5.286) (4.331)
Δ(B_BIS_NOT5)/SHARE 0.308⁎⁎⁎ 0.047
(2.848) (0.463)
Δ(R2_EDF) 12.50⁎⁎⁎ 11.12⁎⁎⁎ 13.00⁎⁎⁎ 10.43⁎⁎⁎
(7.445) (8.258) (8.386) (8.008)
Δ(C2_EDF) −10.92 −9.710 −14.16 −7.478
(−0.545) (−0.484) (−0.546) (−0.347)
ER3M −76.16 12.15 −276.3⁎⁎⁎ −39.35
(−1.262) (0.190) (−4.924) (−0.654)
VPSPX 1.658⁎⁎ 1.054 2.154⁎⁎⁎ 1.197
(2.147) (1.353) (2.879) (1.563)
%Δ5YCMT −14.12 −4.231 −16.31⁎ −7.618
(−1.011) (−0.571) (−1.757) (−0.831)
%ΔHY −4.380 9.708 −41.59⁎⁎⁎ −4.064
(−0.441) (0.910) (−3.476) (−0.576)
%ΔIG −8.901 −4.218 −11.18 18.92
(−0.864) (−0.452) (−1.355) (1.643)
%Δ(OISUS) 4.083 1.652 9.806⁎⁎⁎ 1.830
(1.634) (0.805) (4.880) (0.886)
S_RISK 0.869⁎⁎⁎ 0.773⁎⁎⁎ 0.954⁎⁎⁎ 0.785⁎⁎⁎
(3.065) (2.756) (3.258) (2.706)
Δ(B_FINSNR) 0.653⁎⁎⁎ 1.058⁎⁎⁎
(2.697) (3.853)
Δ(F_NONFIN) −0.219 −0.388
(0.715) (0.592)
Δ(S_SOVX) −0.219 −0.388
(−0.970) (−1.531)
Adjusted R2 0.441 0.465 0.369 0.447
No. of observations 447 447 447 447
⁎⁎⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
⁎⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
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Table B.6
Robustness tests. In the ﬁrst two columns, we repeat the equations estimated in Table B.1, columns II and III but we are using an exposure matrix where we weigh
equally all the exposures. Column III reports the results obtained by running the panel regression as in Table B.2.
Columns IV and V report the results for the estimated in Table B.1, columns II and III but we are using an exposurematrix where we use only sovereign CDS tomeasure
the riskiness of investments. The last column report results were obtained by running the panel regression as in Table B.2.
Δ(•) and %Δ(•) stand for ﬁrst difference and percentage change of the variable over the quarter, respectively. k is the index for countries and t is the index for time. Our
sample runs from the ﬁrst quarter of 2006 to the last quarter of 2010. All equations are estimated by OLSwith robust standard errors, and country ﬁxed effects. The last
column is estimated using also time effects. The standard errors are corrected for both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
a I II III IV V VI
Intercept −7.402⁎ −6.669⁎ 0.443 −2.455 −3.263 8.519⁎⁎⁎
(−1.803) (−1.727) (0.134) (1.34) (−0.834) (4.076)
Δ(B_EQUAL_CDS) 0.396⁎⁎⁎ 0.410⁎⁎
(3.105) (2.151)
Δ(B_EQUAL_RES) 0.167⁎⁎
(2.029)
Δ(S_BIS_CDS) 0.798⁎⁎⁎ 0.978⁎⁎⁎
(2.982) (3.059)
Δ(S_BIS_RES) 0.538⁎⁎⁎
(2.261)
Δ(R2_EDF) 11.22⁎⁎⁎ 10.86⁎⁎⁎ 12.183⁎⁎⁎ 9.159* 11.453⁎⁎⁎ 10.64⁎⁎⁎
(8.724) (8.197) (10.443) (1.875) (8.806) (6.652)
Δ(C2_EDF) −11.71 −5.753 −5.606 4.072 −21.206 8.996
(−0.581) (−0.230) (−0.233) (0.136) (0.587) (0.23)
S_RISK 0.799⁎⁎⁎ 0.785⁎⁎⁎ 0.85⁎⁎⁎ 0.348⁎⁎ 0.907⁎⁎⁎ 0.372⁎
(2.740) (2.781) (2.920) (2.408) (2.818) (1.816)
Global variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
CDS indices Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.460 0.452 0.452 0.430 0.450 0.428
No. of observations 447 447 430 447 447 430
⁎⁎⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
⁎⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Table B.7
The sovereign CDS equation with indices. This table reports the coefﬁcients and t-statistics for the panel regression:
Δ S CDSð Þk;t ¼ αk;0 þ α01  Δ Domestic Government Variablesð Þk;t þ α02  Guaranteesð Þk;t
þ α03  Δ Global Variablesð Þt þ α04  Δ CDS Indicesð Þt þ εk;t
whereΔ(•) and %Δ(•) stand forﬁrst difference andpercentage change of the variable over the quarter, respectively. k is the index for countries and t is the index for time.
In columns III and IV we use the EDFs as a measure of risk for the banking systems instead of the CDS's. Equations reported in columns I to IV are estimated with OLS.
Column V is estimatedwith 2SLS where the change in central bank collateralized loans is an instrument forΔ(B_CDS). Country ﬁxed effects and robust standard errors
are used for all the estimations. The standard errors are corrected for both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
Variable I II III IV V
Intercept 1.218 0.994 −0.686 −0.945 1.687
(0.664) (0.547) (−0.248) (−0.346) (0.8)
Δ(S_IRN_REV) −4.517⁎ −4.467 −4.539 −4.49 −4.595⁎
(−1.691) (−1.638) (−1.378) (−1.348) (−1.951)
S_FDEF_GDP 0.482 0.574⁎ −0.642 −0.521 1.193
(1.582) (1.802) (−0.908) (−0.749) (1.089)
Δ(S_GEXT_L) −8.039⁎⁎ −8.04⁎⁎ −9.531⁎⁎ −9.532⁎⁎ −7.511⁎⁎
(−2.5) (−2.48) (−2.361) (−2.343) (−2.273)
Δ(M_CA) 4.528⁎ 4.349⁎ 5.213⁎ 5.005⁎ 4.111⁎
(1.733) (1.661) (1.757) (1.663) (1.589)
Δ(S_DEBT_GDP) 3.006⁎⁎⁎ 2.947⁎⁎⁎ 2.557⁎⁎⁎ 2.484⁎⁎⁎ 3.038⁎⁎⁎
(4.813) (4.548) (5.612) (5.005) (3.464)
GUARANTEES 0.109⁎⁎ 0.127⁎⁎ 0.111⁎⁎
(2.167) (2.208) (2.043)
Δ(B_CDS) × B_GDP 0.075⁎⁎⁎ 0.075⁎⁎⁎ 0.101⁎⁎⁎
(4.097) (4.135) (11.14)
Δ(B_EDF) × B_GDP 1.485⁎⁎⁎ 1.521⁎⁎⁎
(7.215) (7.458)
ER3M 11.06 10.21 0.015 −1.132 11.89
(0.599) (0.554) (0.001) (−0.058) (0.588)
VPSPX 0.206 0.273 0.777 0.858⁎ 0.106
(0.63) (0.85) (1.52) (1.711) (0.293)
%Δ5YCMT −23.15⁎⁎⁎ −22.823⁎⁎⁎ −28.98⁎⁎⁎ −28.587⁎⁎⁎ −20.631⁎⁎⁎
(−2.617) (−2.593) (−2.717) (−2.674) (−2.636)
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Table B.7 (continued)
Variable I II III IV V
%ΔHY 9.278 9.210 10.949⁎⁎ 10.911⁎ 9.219
(1.594) (1.574) (1.976) (1.961) (1.559)
%ΔIG 6.965 −2.088 14.880⁎⁎ −2.112⁎⁎ −2.114
(1.529) (1.547) (2.555) (2.554) (0.834)
%ΔOISUS 0.718⁎⁎⁎ −2.088⁎⁎⁎ 0.826⁎⁎⁎ −2.112⁎⁎⁎ −2.114⁎⁎⁎
(−3.166) (−3.044) (−3.063) (−2.971) (−2.944)
Δ(S_SOVX) 0.718⁎⁎⁎ 0.700⁎⁎⁎ 0.826⁎⁎⁎ 0.805⁎⁎⁎ 0.661⁎⁎⁎
(4.563) (4.307) (4.237) (4.012) (3.561)
Δ(F_NONFIN) −0.030 −0.045⁎⁎ −0.140 −0.157 −0.004
(−0.296) (−0.451) (−1.150) (−1.331) (−0.034)
Δ(B_FINSNR) −0193⁎⁎⁎ −0.174⁎⁎⁎ 0.073 0.094 −0.280⁎⁎
(−2.788) (−2.442) (0.997) (1.307) (−2.291)
Adjusted R2 0.615 0.615 0.527 0.528 0.603
No. of observations 424 424 424 424 424
⁎⁎⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
⁎⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Table B.8
Sovereign equation on sub-periods and with time ﬁxed effects. The ﬁrst two columns report the coefﬁcients and t-statistics for the following panel regression, per-
formed on two subperiods:
Δ S CDSð Þk;t ¼ αk;0 þ α01  Δ Domestic Government Variablesð Þk;t þ α02  Guaranteesð Þk;t
þ α03  Δ Global Variablesð Þt þ α04  Δ CDS Indicesð Þt þ εk;t
The last three columns report the coefﬁcients and t-statistics for the panel regression:
Δ S CDSð Þk;t ¼ αk;0 þ α0;t þ α1  Guaranteesk;t þ α02  Δ Local Government Variablesð Þk;t þ εk;t
We perform the analysis ﬁrst for the whole sample from the ﬁrst quarter of 2004 to the last quarter of 2010. Afterward we perform the same analysis on sub-periods.
These regressions are performed with time ﬁxed effects.
Δ(•) and %Δ(•) stand for ﬁrst difference and percentage change of the variable over the quarter, respectively. k is the index for countries and t is the index for time. All
equations are estimatedwith 2SLS where the change in central bank colleralised loans is an instrument forΔ(B_CDS). The regressions are estimatedwith country ﬁxed
effects and robust standard errors. The standard errors are corrected for both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
Variable Q1 2004–Q4 2007 Q1 2008–Q4 2010 Time effects,
Q1 2004–Q4 2010
Time effects,
Q1 2004–Q4 2007
Time effects,
Q1 2008–Q4 2010
Intercept −0.136 12.86 4.294* 0.581 9.872*
(−0.464) (1.636) (8.56) (1.596) (3.545)
Δ(S_IRN_REV) −0.56* −6.136 −4.444* −0.476 −5.314
(−1.706) (−1.532) (−1.829) (−1.431) (−1.523)
S_FDEF_GDP −0.187 2.691 2.315 −0.18 2.928
(−0.863) (1.457) (1.496) (−0.784) (1.486)
Δ(S_GEXT_L) 0.03 −10.96** −8.374** 0.094 −11.22**
(0.243) (−2.204) (−2.096) (0.617) (−2.209)
Δ(M_CA) 0.151 1.87 4.419 0.107 3.282
(0.368) (0.744) (1.543) (0.286) (1.027)
Δ(S_DEBT_GDP) 0.106 2.581 4.876** 0.048 5.214*
(0.934) (1.65) (2.123) (0.489) (1.926)
Guarantees 0.129** 0.076 0.102
(2.469) (0.837) (1.304)
Δ(B_CDS) × B_GDP −0.027 0.104⁎⁎⁎ 0.108⁎⁎⁎ −0.031 0.101⁎⁎⁎
(−0.537) (6.816) (10.6) (−0.642) (6.952)
Global variables and CDS index Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.269 0.620 0.573 0.260 0.603
No. of observations 225 199 424 225 199
⁎⁎⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
⁎⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
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Table B.9
Robustness check. Sovereign equation on sub-periods and with time ﬁxed effects. The ﬁrst three columns report the coefﬁcients and t-statistics for the following panel
regression, performed on the overall sample and two subperiods:
Δ S CDSð Þk;t ¼ αk;0 þ α01  Δ Domestic Government Variablesð Þk;t þ α02  Guaranteesð Þk;t
þ α03  Δ Global Variablesð Þt þ α04  Δ CDS Indicesð Þt þ εk;t
The last three columns report the coefﬁcients and t-statistics for the panel regression:
Δ S CDSð Þk;t ¼ αk;0 þ α0;t þ α1  Guaranteesk;t þ α02  Δ Local Government Variablesð Þk;t þ εk;t
We perform the analysis ﬁrst for the whole sample from the ﬁrst quarter of 2005 to the last quarter of 2010. Afterward we perform the same analysis on sub-periods.
These regressions are performed with time ﬁxed effects.
Δ(•) and %Δ(•) stand for ﬁrst difference and percentage change of the variable over the quarter, respectively. k is the index for countries and t is the index for time. All
equations are estimated with 2SLS where the average leverage of the biggest banks is an instrument for Δ(B_CDS). The regressions are estimated with country ﬁxed
effects and robust standard errors. The standard errors are corrected for both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
Variable Q1 2005–Q4
2010
Q1 2005–Q4
2007
Q1 2008–Q4
2010
Time effects,
Q1 2005–Q4 2010
Time effects,
Q1 2005–Q4 2007
Time effects,
Q1 2008–Q4 2010
Intercept 2.795 −0.127 14.62 5.615*** 0.244 15.73***
(1.210) (−0.149) (1.456) (6.472) (0.226) (2.717)
Δ(S_IRN_REV) −5.598 0.250 −5.919 −4.892 0.215 −5.793
(−1.405) (0.191) (−1.482) (−1.384) (0.126) (−1.420)
S_FDEF_GDP 2.127 −0.109 2.906 3.204 −0.129 2.946
(1.314) (−0.361) (1.140) (1.255) (−0.409) (1.084)
Δ(S_GEXT_L) −7.103*** 0.009 −11.25** −7.624*** 0.000 −11.30**
(−2.983) (0.056) (−2.365) (−2.650) (0.000) (−2.352)
Δ(M_CA) 4.518* 0.002 1.932 3.694 −0.148 1.932
(1.681) (0.003) (0.707) (1.546) (−0.193) (0.675)
Δ(S_DEBT_GDP) 3.249** 0.187 2.640 2.883** 0.162 2.596
(2.504) (1.450) (1.584) (2.038) (1.319) (1.332)
GUARANTEES 0.121* 0.141*** 0.124 0.144**
(1.915) (2.699) (1.536) (2.530)
Δ(B_CDS) × B_GDP 0.138*** 0.033 0.105*** 0.140*** 0.054 0.106***
(2.713) (0.407) (2.618) (3.313) (0.559) (2.629)
Global variables & CDS indices Yes Yes Yes
With time ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.534 0.549 0.609 0.517 0.187 0.602
No. of observations 382 195 187 382 195 187
⁎⁎⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
⁎⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Table B.10
Sovereign CDS is affected by bank exposures. Column I reports the coefﬁcients and t-statistics for the sovereign panel regression including information about banks'
assets:
Δ S CDSð Þk;t ¼ αk;0 þ α01  Δ Domestic Variablesð Þk;t þ α02  Explicit Guaranteesð Þk;t
þ α3  Δ B BIS CDSð Þk;t þ α04  Δ Local Bank Variablesð Þk;t
þ α05  Δ Global Variablesð Þt þ α6  Δ CDS Indicesð Þt þ εk;t
Column II presents the results from the same regression but using time ﬁxed effects instead of global variables and CDS indices.
Δ(•) and %Δ(•) stand for ﬁrst difference and percentage change of the variable over the quarter, respectively. k is the index for countries and t is the index for time.
Country ﬁxed effects and robust standard errors are used in all cases. The standard errors are corrected for both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
Variable I II
Intercept −2.195 4.529***
(−0.683) (3.163)
Δ(S_IRN_REV) −8.324 −8.333
(−0.949) (−0.905)
S_FDEF_GDP −1.648 −2.121
(−1.542) (−1.335)
Δ(S_GEXT_L) −7.799** −7.877**
(−2.633) (−2.465)
Δ(M_CA) 2.757 2.964
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Table B.10 (continued)
Variable I II
(1.314) (1.311)
Δ(S_DEBT_GDP) 2.330*** 2.345***
(6.358) (4.973)
GUARANTEES 0.056 0.065
(0.493) (0.587)
Δ(EDF_ALL) 45.245** 51.026**
(2.073) (1.985)
Δ(B_BIS_CDS) 0.366*** 0.424***
(2.842) (3.463)
Global variables & CDS indices Yes
Time ﬁxed effects Yes
Adjusted R2 0.583 0.578
No. of observations 412 412
⁎ Means signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
⁎⁎⁎
Means signiﬁcant at the 1% level.⁎⁎
Means signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
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